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PREFACE 
There are innumerable works on fair-trade legisla. tion and discount 
house operations. Much research has been conducted by private and public 
organizations to determine the extent of discount house operations. 
However, very little inf'orira.tion is available in one volume that shows 
the underlying factors which permit the coexistence of discounting opera-
tions and legislation pr~hibiting such operations. 
This study is made on the basis of published material found in the 
Oklahoma State University and Oklahoma University libraries. The purpose 
of this study is to bring together information that reveals the combina-
., 
tions of forces re~ponsible for the existence of a recent trend in I'S-
tail distribution--the development of the discount house, in view of the 
history of resale-price maintenance legislation. 
The following criteria were used in selecting the listed items 
among the hundreds of articles, pamphlets, and books written on retail 
discounting and resale-price maintenance legislation. (1) Standard 
college texts in marketing, retailing, and government regulation of 
- . 
business were omitted, since this information is usually of a general 
nature. (2) Long and well-documented articles were considered more 
~ 
useful than short reports lacking citations. (3) In general, well-
grounded articles and journals received somewhat more attention than 
trade journals, and the latter were preferred to popular magazines. (4) 
A few important articles appearing in Retailing Daily, the newspaper 




were included. (5) Recent materials have been emphasized, although 
some older sources are included because of their historical importance 
or contribution to the development of marketing thought. (6) An 
effort has been rrade to cbtain citations from diverse sources represent-
ing different trades and industries. 
Undoubtedly some wortnwhile materials have bean inadvertently 
omitted because of the broad range of the subject under consideration. 
The writ er is indebted to the staff members of the DeJRrtment of 
Business Administration who have offered advice and enco urage.ment dur-
ing the preparation of this study. Indebtedness is acknowledged to 
Professor George Hill for his invaluable aid and suggestions given dur-
ing the course of this study. His keen interest and generous grants of 
time are thankfully acknowledged. Special thanks is given to the writer's 
wife for her patient help and cooperation during the preparation and t,yp-
ing of this thesis. 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
Io INTRODUCTION: THE PROBIEM AND ITS IMPORTANCE o • • 0 l 
~eed for the Study • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Hypothesis and Basic Asswnptions •••••• 
Scope of the Study " • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Definition of Discount House •••••••• 
Procedure of the Study • • • • • • • • • • • 
O O O O 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 






II. RESALE-PRICE MAINTENANCE LAWS OOOGOOOOOOO 6 
History of the Enactment of Resale-Price Maintenance .. 
Laws o o o o o a o o a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Theories of Resale-Price Maintenance ••••••••• 
Miller-Tydings Act and Appurtenant Court Decisions •• 

























Types of Discount House Operations • • • o • • • • • • 
Dealers Who Operate Eatirely on a Discount Basis~ 
Ordinary Dealers Who Stress Discount Sales •••• 
Dealers Who Conduct an Informal Discount Business 
Operating Characteristics of Discount Houses ••••• 
Extent of Discount Selling. • • •••• o •• 
§,ources of Merchandise" • o • • • • • • .. • • 
Brands Sold • o • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • o 
Customers Served. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Costs of Operation. • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • 
Inventory • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Warranty and Repair Services ••••••••••• 
Locationo o o ') o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 
Auxiliary Services. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Turnover o o o o o o o o o °' o o a o o °' o o o o o 
Reasons for Growth of Discount Houses ••••••• 
Reasons Out of Manufacturers' Control. • • 
Rea::~rnns Within Manufacturersv. Control •• ., ••• 
ENFORCEMENT OF RESALE-PRICE MAINTENANCE LA.WS •• 0 • 30 
Enforcement Procedures • • • • • • • ., • • • • • • • • 31 
Source of Complaints. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 31 
Disposition of Complaints. • • • • • • • • • • • 32 
Anticipation of Defenses. • • • • • • • 33 
Enforcement Action Available. • • • • • • • • • • 34 
Suit Against Discounters. • • • • • • • • • • 35 
Enforcement Difficulties • • • • • • • • • • • • • ., • 37 





Consumers Uncooperative in Providing Proof of. o 
Violation by Retailerso ••••••••• o • • 38 
Discordance in Resale-Price Maintenance Legislation 38 
Resale-price maintained goods involved in ••• 
interstate commerce o • • • • • • • • • • o • 38 
Legality of the nonsigner clause • • • • • • • 39 
MARKETING CONSIDERATIONS •.••••• Q O O 0 O C O 0 0 0 0 0 41 
The Mechanics of Distribution. • .. • • • • • • • • • • 42 
The Consumer Revolution. • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • o 44 
Social and Economic Changes ••••••••••••••• 46 
Considerations for Changes in the Nature of Competitiono 49 
Mass Producti.on • • o • o • • • • • • • • • • • • • 49 
Discount Houses • • • o • • • • • • o • • • o • • • 50 
Inventories • • • • • e • • • • • • • o • • • • • o 50 
Mixed Carload Ship.ments • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 50 · 
Trade-in Transactions • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 50 
Trends in Retail Distribution ••••• o •••••••• 51 
Decisicm to Buy a.t Discount. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 53 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 0 0 0 0 ,a, O O 0 0 0 • 0 0 • 0 • • 0 
Nature of the Problem Surnm.a.rized •• 000000000 




BIBLIOGRAPHY ••• o •• 0 O 0 oo&ooooe 0 0 0 • • 0 9 & 0 0 0 60 
vi 
CHAPI'ER I 
INTRODUCTIONi THE PROBLEM AND I'rS IMPORTANCE 
The discount houses sell their merchandise at a discount regardless 
of the resale-price maintenance laws, which empower manufacturers with 
the right to establish the retail list price of their trade-marked 
products. 
Need for the Study 
Resale-Price Maintenance Laws., which were initially presumed to be 
desirable legislation from the social standpoint, are rapidly losing 
their force and effect in the United Statese As is true of much legis-
lation, the passage of time brings about changes in our society and 
econom,y that make inoperative or obsolete legislation previously con-
sidered desirable. Also., some legislation, although still desirable to 
society, fails to serve the intended purpose because of the lack of 
effectiveness in the enferce.ment .machinery .. 
Resale price-cutting of price=maintained goods by discounters is 
one of the .most prominent problems facing our distribution system today. 
This is evidenced by hundreds of articles on the subject in trade jour-
nals serving .many different industries o Writers of marketing textbooks 
are recognizing the problem by the inclusion of general information on 
the subject in ·their works o 
The writers of these texts and articles have divulged many differ-
ent reasons for the continued existence of discounting of resale-price 
1 
maintained goods. Their reasons are usually based upon the legal 
and/or marketing considerations. 
2 
This study is a compilation of the considerations given in leading 
publications available in most college or university libraries. 
Many students of marketing who have been only partially exposed 
to the subject of discounting and resale-price legislation are under 
the false impression that the breakdown of "fair-trade" laws is due to 
lack of enforcemento This, of course, is true to a certain extent ~n 
any legislation which operates imperfectly. However, there are under-
lying reasons why the enforcement of laws break down. One purpose of 
this study is to study and analyze considerations other than purely 
legal ones to suggest the reasons for the enforcement breakdown. This 
writer makes no claim for originality in these considerations. This is 
a compilation of the factors in the economy today of which most students 
of marketing are aware but fail to consider vtien expounding on the rela-
tive lack of enforcement of "fair-trade" laws. 
Hypothesis and Basic Asswnptions 
Before a person can approach a problem of this nature, he must 
first pose an hypothesis that will be the possible solution to the prob-
lem itself. The hypothesis of this study is as fella.vs: the breakdown 
of the resale-price maintenance laws is chiefly a result of the transi-
tion from a sellers' to a buyers' market. 
This hypothesis, of course, requires the introduction of certain 
basic assumptions. One of these assumptions is that Newton's Law of 
Action and Reaction is a natural law that is applicable to marketing. 
This law applies when businessmen overestimate their markets and 
demand slackens. A reaction sets in and prices are cut to move the 
products. 
3 
Another assumption is that when the consumer's disposable incane 
increases, especially in conjunction with widely available supplies of 
goods and services, he ordinarily has more bargaining power in the 
market place • 
Scope of the Study 
This study is not concerned with mandat ory resale-price legisla-
tion such as exists in some states on the resale of liquor. This study 
is concerned only with t he permissive resale-price maintenance laws as 
originally passed by f orty-five of the forty-ei ght states. 
This study seeks to define the areas in which discount houses vio-
late the resale-price maintenance laws and analyzes the factors which 
permit the continued operations of these "price-cutting" retailers. 
Further along in this study, the writer has considered t he history 
of the enactment of t he so- called "fair-tr ade" laws; t he nature of dis-
count house operations; the enforcement of the price maintenance laws; 
and the marketing considerations which have been and are i nflue ntial in 
enabling the discount houses to operate successfully. 
Definition of Discount House 
In practice, the terms "discount selling" and "discount house" 
embrace a wide variety of retail selling techniques, such as differen-
tial pricing, diversion of trade from conventional channels, and non-
compliance with manufacturer- set-minimum prices, all of which have 
important implications for marketing strategy and economic analysis. 
4 
The latter, noncompliance with manufacturer-set-minimum prices, will be 
the definition adhered to in this study. 
Procedure of the Study 
The enactment of the resale-price maintenance laws has first been 
discussed in order to give the reader a better understanding of the 
road the laws traveled from their inception to reach their present posi-
tion. No critical analysis of the laws has been undertaken because the 
writer has viewed this aspect as being primarily beyond the scope of the 
subject. The study of the enactment of the resale-price mainterance law-s 
encompasses all important legislation and decisions from 1931 through 
1952. In 1952 the McGuire Act, which was the last major enactment con-
concerning these laws, was passed. 
The subject of discount house operations has next been presented in 
order to bring out the inherent characteristics of such retail outlets 
which have placed the discounter in such an advantageous position today. 
An attempt is ma.de to show that the discount house is a ratural phenom-
enon, arising out of the structure of the laws themselves. 
Next , the enforcement nachinery which the manufacturer or whole-
saler has at his disposal to enforce the price-maintenance laws has been 
presented. A thorough examination of the enforcement procedure has been 
proffered so the reader will realize t hat the law has provi ded th · polic-
ing groups with mans to enforce the laws if the.y lE.. desire. 
Following the legal procedure there is an analysis of our distribu-
tion system. The rise of the "common man" and other competitive con-
siderations which have encouraged policing groups to be lax in enforce-
ment are observed. 
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The writer has tried diligently in this study to show no bias 
toward any group int ere st. In keeping with this, the phrase 11Resale-
Price Maintenance Laws 11 was preferred to "Fair-Trade Laws 11 because the 
latter phrase has ethical implications. Furthermore, the terms 11legiti-
m.ate11 or "illegitimate" dealers were avoided as much as possible and 
when any such controversial terms have been used they are placed in 
quotation marks • 
CHAPI'ER II 
RESALE-PRICE MAINTENANCE LA.WS 
Resale-price maintenance statutes were enacted in the decade before 
World War II to protect trade-mark owners, distributors, and the public 
1;1.gainst injurious and uneconomic practices in the distribution of articles 
of standard quality under a disti.nguishe d trade-.m.rk brand or name .1 
An examination of the history of resale-price maintenance laws is 
necessary before an analysis can be nade of the areas of violation. 
History of the Enactment of Resale-Price Maintenance Laws 
After 1900 the increased sale of specialty products with clistinc-
tive brands and trade-marks gave rise to efforts on the pa.rt of certain 
manufacturers to control the resale prices of their products. Since s11eh 
products were often unique and distinctive, their manufacturers often 
were in a. good position to control prices; and attempts were .m.de in 
some cases to regulate and possibly .maximize profits by establishing 
prices at the wholesale and retail levels. 
Government agencies responsible for the enforcement of antitrust 
laws, however, declared that vertical agreements to maintain resale 
prices were an illegal restraint of trade .2 
1"Fair Trade Laws and Discount Selling," Harvard~ Review, Vol. 
64, (Jw1e, 1951), p. 1327. 
2ll!Iund., Vernon A., Gover.rurant and Business (2nd ed.), (New York: 




Some retailers soon found that they could increase their busira ss 
volume by cutting prices on trade-marked brands. Tha manufacturers., 
feeling that this price-cutting would endanger the reputation of their 
brand names, soon started resale-price maintenance movements to prevent 
this. Small retailers took over the fight for price maintenance, however, 
as a weapon against the large chains and other •1price-cutters. n3 
Measures that would legalize resale-price .maintenance were intro-
duced into ea·ch session of Congress between 1914 and the year of their 
adoption., 1937 • 
.New Jersey enacted a law in 1916 permitting price maintenance 11by 
notice," but the first really modern price-maintemnce law was enacted 
in California in 1931. The 1931 California law and its 1933 amendment 
was promulgated in the drug and pharmaceutical associations of that 
state. As a result of the peculiar characteristics of the drug trade 
and of persistent and effective organizational pressure, it has had 
more experience under price-maintenance laws than any type of business. 
Hence, we must look to it for the main body of evidence concerning the 
nature and the consequences of resale-price regulations.4 
The most successful area for resale-price maintenance has been in 
drugs. 'fhe consumer has little knowledge of drug and cosmetic products 
and hesitates to take chances on a product not backed by the brand of a 
leading pharmaceutical house. The derrand for drugs is(relatively inflex-
ible, and price may not be so powerful as habit in guiding dEl.rnand. In 
3seib? Char le s B., "Fair "l'rade Faces Showdown., 11 Nation I s Business, 
Vol. 43, (March, 1955), ppo 34-37. 
4nrether, E. T., Price Control Under Fair Trade Legislation., (New 
York., 1939), P• 83. 
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the drug field even the chain stores go along with the "fair-trading" 
of the leading trade-marked items. At the same time the drug chains 
feature their own lower-priced brsnds of drug products. The existence 
of powerful trade associations working closely with the trade press has 
been an added factor in maintaining the discipline of 11 fair-trade 11 pric-
ing in drugs .5 
No new developments immediately followed the passage of the price-
maintenance law of 1931. The price-maintenance law of that year was not 
adhered to for the following reasons: (1) the inherent nature of the 
Act as a voluntary contractual statute providing no basis for control 
over noncontracting parties; (2) the impossibility of regulating non-
contracting parties when prices were controlled only in California and 
goods were easily accessible outside the state; (3) the fact that the 
depression had not as yet moved into its most critical state, and there 
was the general belief that prosperity was in sight; (4) the concern of 
manufacturers with volume of sales rather than price stabilization in the 
retail market; and (5) the lack of concerted persistent efforts by re-
tailers to exert pressure upon manufacturers and wholesalers to employ 
the act.6 It might be noted at this point that several of the same 
reasons given in that era for the i-neffe-ctiveness of re sale-price main- · 
tenance laws are present today. 
Prior to the passage of state and federal resale-price maintenance 
legislation, the courts permitted various practices that assisted in 
5Kaplan, A, D, H., S.rrall Business: Its Place and Problems., (New 
York, 1948), pp. 199-205, 
6Grether, E, T., Price Control Under Fair Trade Legislation., (New 
York, 1939), p. 84. 
maintaining retail prices. The actions that were allowed and often 
enabled manufacturers to control retail prices were: 
L Announcing recommended resale priceso 
2. Announcing an intention to refuse to sell to dealers who do not 
follow suggested prices. 
3. Refusal to deal with firms that have eut prices. 
4. Using reasonable (not coercive) methods of collecting information 
about price-cutters and in working with them. 
5. Employing a bona fide system of agency under which title does not 
pass to the buyers.? 
In 1933, an amendment to the California price-maintenance law of 
1931 carried the fight to legalize resale-price maintenance closer to 
victory. That amendment, upheld by the Supreme Court in 1936, read: 
9 
"Willfully and .lmowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling 
any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered 
into pursuant to the provision of Section I of the Act, whether the per-
son so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a party 
to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of 
any person damaged thereby. 11 8 
This amendment) commonly known as the nonsigner clause, compelled 
third parties to comply with agreements between other retailers and their 
suppliers. In effect, one retailer could make an agreement that bound 
other retailers who might be opposed to the agreement; therefore, this 
- - - - ·-
agreement greatly simplified the problem that manufacturers fac~d in 
getting widespread compliance with their minimum r~tail prices.9 A 
total of fourteen states had adopted similar legislation by 1936. 
Theories of Resale-Price Maintenance 
There are .many ideas concerning the appropriate.ness of resale-price 
7Qxenfeldt., Alfred R • ., Industrial Pricing and Market Practices., 
(New York), pp. 422-429. 
8Ibid • ., p. 424. 
9Ibid., P• 425. 
10 
maintenance. All the views may be classed into two basic competing con-
cepts. These may be designated as the monopoly theory and the good will 
theory. The former stresses the importance of price competition; the 
latter, the right of a trade-mark or brand-name owner to protect himself 
from unfair competition. 
Mr. Justice Sutherland in the Old Dearborn Distilling Company versus 
Seagram Distillers Corporation Case in 1936 said: 
"The sale of identified goods at less than the price fixed by the 
owner of the trade-mark is an assault upon the good will and constitutes 
what the statute ffi.e is referring here to the Illinois l8sale-price 
maintenance statutv denominates 'unfair competition'·" 
He also added in the next paragraph of his opinion: 
"There is a great body of fact and opinion tending to show that 
price-cutting by retail dealers is not only injurious to the good will 
and business of the producer and distributor of identified goods, but 
injurious to the general public as we11o 11ll 
Also, in 1936, a federal statute, the Sherman Act, supported the 
".monopoly theory." Mr. Justice Hughes, as early as 1911, speaking for 
the Supreme Court in the Case of Dr. Miles Medical Company versus Park 
and Sons Company had said: 
"The advantage of established retail prices primarily concerns the 
dealers. The enlarged profits which would result from adherence to the 
established rates would go to them and not to the complainant o It is 
through the inability of tbe favored dealers to realize these profits, 
on account of the described com.petition, that the complainant works out 
its alleged injury. If there be advantage to a manufacturer in the 
maintenance of fixed retail prices, the question remains whether it is 
one which he is entitled to secure by agreements restricting the freedom 
of trade on the part of the dealers who own what they sell. As to this, 
the complainant can fare no better with a plan of identical contracts 
than could the dealers themselves if they formed a combination and en-
deavored to establish the same restrictions, and thus achieve the same 
lOBowman., Ward s., "Resale Price Maintenance--A Monopoly Problem," 
Journal of Business, Vol. 25, (July, 1952), pp. 141-144. 
11Ibid., pp. 141-144. 
11 
result •••.•• Agreements or combinations between dealers, having 
for their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of 
prices, are injurious to the public interest and voice. They are not 
saved by the advart.ages which the participants expect to derive from 
the enhanced price to the consu.mer.1112 
The outcome of the controversy over resale-price maintenance was, 
until 1951 and the Schwegmann decision, a victory for the good will 
theory. This is not to say, however, that the monopoly aspects of the 
problem were completely ignored. Horizontal agreeBE nts among competitors 
were never sanctionect.13 
Miller-Tydings Act and Appurtenant Court Decisions 
Pressure for federal legislation declined after 1933, as resale 
prices were established under the codes sanctioned by the National 
Industrial Recovery Act. However, agitation was again revived when the 
National Industrial Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional. The con-
flict between the state law and the federal law was resolved, or at 
least so it was thought., by a 1937 amendment to the Sherman Act. This 
amend.nl:!nt, the Miller-Tydings Act, changed the Sherman Act to exempt 
resale-price agreements in interstate commerce when commodities are 
shipped into states in which such contracts are legal. The amendment 
further declared that the .making of resale-price contracts shall not be 
regarded as unfair competition. The a.mended Act also stated, 11Tha.t 
every contract, combination in the' form of a trust or a conspiracy, ip. 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with a foreign 
. 
12Ibid. , p. 143. 
13Ibid., P• 144. 
12 
nation is hereby declared to be illegai.u14 
With the apparent removal of antitrust obstacles, forty-five states 
had ena.cted fair-trade laws by 1941. 
A manufacturer desires to maintain price identity and sizable rnar-
gins for his distributors in order to secure many outlets for his prod-
uct. Also, when several producers of the same class of co.rnm.odities 
11 fair-trade 11 their products, each is protected by legislation against 
loss of sales to the other because of severe competition at the local 
level. By maintaining local prices, manufacturers may also maintain 
t.heir factory prices. Higher final prices provide a large source of 
profit for each segment of distribution.15 
The effectiveness of resale-price contracts was restricted by the 
Supreme Court decision in the Schwegmann Brothers versus Calvert Dis-
tillers Corporation Case in 1951. Schwegmann Bro the rs ope rated a large 
supermarket in New Orleans, Louisiana. They sold Calvert Whiskey for 
$3.25 per fifth, but the resale-maintained price by Calvert Distillers 
was $4.37 per fifth" The Louisiana Resale-Price Maintenance Act con-
tained the non signer clause, and Calvert brought suit to prevent Schweg-
mann Brothers from selling at a lower price.16 
In defense, Schwegmann contended that the use of the nonsigner 
clause in interstate commerce violated the Sherman Act. The lower courts 
14weston, Glen E • ., 11Resale Price Maintenance and Market Integration: 
Fair Trade or Foul Play?" George ~ashington Law Review, Vol. 22, (June, 
1954), P• 675. 
15Mund, Vernon A., Govern,mnt and Business (2nd ed.), (New York, 
1955), p. 471. 
16senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce: Hearings 
.2.£ H. R. 5767 (Resale Pr.ice Fixing), (Washington, 1952), p. 605. 
13 
rejected this defense. Schwegmann appealed to tm Supreme Court, which 
upheld Schwegmann and declared that the Miller-Tydings Law does not 
sanction the nom.signer clause. This clause does not appear in the 1937 
law, and tm conrt said that it would not read the nonsigner provision 
into the Miller-Tydings Law. Justice Douglas speaking for the CoUII't in 
regard to the Miller-Tydings A.mendm:rnt said: 
"The Act sanctions only I contracts or agreements. 1 If a distribu-
tor and one or more retailers want to agree, combine, or conspire to 
fix a minimum price, they can do so if state law permits. Their con-
tract, combination, or conspiracy--hitherto illegal--is made lawful •• 
• • • When they seek, however, to impose price fixing on persons who 
have not contracted or agreed to the scheme, the situation is vastly 
different. That is not price fixing by contract or agreement; that is 
price fixing by compulsion. That is not following the path of consen-
sual agreement; that is resort to coercion. 11 17 
Therefore, the Miller-Tydings Amnd.Jrant applied only to persons who 
signed the resale-price contract and not to nonsigners, even though they 
had notice of the fixed prices. 
The Sunbeam Corporation versus Wentling Case in 1950 had previously 
weakened the resale-price maintenance law. Wentling, a mail-order 
dealer, and also a nonsigner, in Pennsylvania, had been making both in-
trastate and interstate sales of Sunbeam electric shavers at less than 
the price Sunbeam had stipulated. In the suit Sunbeam brought against 
Wentling, the Court of Appeals in its first decision said: "The Penn-
sylvania statutes cannot govern sales by Pennsylvania retailers to con-
sumers in other states." Therefore, Sunbeam was denied protection 
against Wentling in making interstate sales at less than the maintained 
re sale price for Pennsylvania. In 1951, shortly after the Sehwegmann 
decision, the Court of Appeals declared in a second decision in the 
l7Mund, Vernon Ae, Government and Business (2nd ed.), (New York, 
1955), P• 472. 
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Wentling Case that a party not signing a price-maintenance contract 
cannot be subjected to the nonsigner provision of a state law on sales 
nade w.i.. thin a state vvhere interstate trade is involved. 18 
It seems that the main effect of the Wentling decision was to give 
a nonsigning, mail-order house in one state the legal right to sell and 
ship into another state at prices belov1 the locally maintained prices. 
Both manufacturers and retailers found the decisions of the Schweg-
mann and Wentling cases very disturbing. If a mariufacturer wished to 
Inaintain resale prices thereafter, he had to make and police individual 
contracts with his many retailers in each state. This situation, of 
course, placed a hardship upon the manufacturers. Mail-order houses 
selling in interstate conunerce dealt local retailers a great deal of 
price competition. Mainly because of these circumstances, Congress had 
pressure exerted upon it to amend the Miller-Tydings Act by adding the 
nonsigner clause and making the resale-price agreement established in 
one state applicable to sales in other states. 
McGuire Act 
In 1952, the McGuire Act was passed which removed the basis of the 
Schwegmann and Wentling decisions and made permissible the use of the 
nonsigner clause within a given state, in accordance with the legisla-
tion of the state, by manufacturers selling in interstate commerce. 
This act also authorized tbe fixing of stipulated resale prices. En-
forcement action, however, was authorized only for sales belm'J the 
l811Fair 'rrade: A Half-Hearted Comeback," Headings in Marketing, 
ed. J. H. Westing, (New York, 1953), pp. 287-290. 
stipulated prices. rrhe essence of tte McGuire Act was to enable a 
manufacturer to require all retailers in a "fair-trade II state to ob-
serve the minimum or actual prices which are fixed in a written con-
tract made with one retailer in that state .19 
15 
The Act also declared that neither the authorized agreement nor the 
nonsigner agreements nshall constitute an unlawful burden or restraint 
upon, or interference with, interstate commerce." This clause was 
designed to remedy the nail-order loophole left by the Wentling deci-
sion. The provision was intended to restrain mail-order houses from 
quoting prices to out-of-state buyers which are lower than the maintained 
prices in the state in which the mail-order house is located. 20 
The fight for the McGuire Bill was led by the Bureau of Education 
.QQ Fair Trade and the A.m3 ri can Fair Trade Council, both of which were 
backed largely by large drug concerns and druggists' associations. 
At the present time the McGuire Act is in force. It has been chal-
lenged several ti.mes, but the Supreme Court has not ren::lered any deci-
sion concerning the constitutionality of this Act. 
19 11use of Resale Price Maintenance by Integrated Manufacturers--A 
New Loophole for Abuse of Monopoly Power, 11 Yale Law Journal, Vol. 64, 
(January, 1955), pp. 428-430. 
20Ibict., PP· 431-432. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DISCOUNT HOUSE 
The terms "discount house" and "discount selling" cover a wide 
variety of retail selling techniques, such as cliff erential pricing, 
diversion of trade from conventional channels, and noncompliance with 
minimwn prices set by a manufacturer, all of which are important con-
siderations for marketing strategy. This study pertains mainly to 
retail discount selling through establishments openly offering merchan-
dise at a price lo-wer than the manufacturer's "regular" dealers ask for 
the same merchandise. 
A discount house is a retail establishment that sells all or most 
of its merchandise at a discount from the manufacturer's listed retail 
price or at prices substantially lower than those at which other types 
of retailers sell.1 
Types of Discount House Operations 
Discount houses take so many forms they are hard to define. 
Besides, there is so much back-door selling by otherwise "legitimate" 
retailers, it is hard to identify the discounter. 
Dealers Who Operate Entirely on a Discount Basis. 
'rhis for.m of discount house encompasses all the characteristics of 
1Ra.YJYlond, Robert s., "The Discount House and Fair Trade,'' The 
Pennsylvania Business Survey, Vol. 49, No. 9, May 13, 1955, p. 4. 
16 
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the operation of true discount houses. The clientele of this operation 
are usually members of some business, professional, or social organiza-
tion who have established 11buying clubs" for the procurement of merchan-
dise at a discount through these discount houses. An authorized identi-
fication card is necessary before a person is admitted to the showroom 
to make purchases. This type of operation ordinarily renders none of 
the usual services, such as credit, wrapping, and delivery. Also, no 
guarantee of service or _p3rformance is made.2 
The following types of discount houses represent deviations from 
the ordinary discount operations in that they serve customers who buy 
at the regular list price and groups who buy at a discount. 
Ordinary Dealers Who Stress Discount Sales. 
This type of a discount house serves customers who pay the regular 
list price as well as those who are allowed discounts because of certain 
buying groups of which they are members. Discounters selling through 
this type of an operation perform the various services with which the 
ordinary discount house dispenses.3 
One of the oldest forms of discount operation is an informal dis-
count business in which the retailer allows a discount to his friends. 
Dealers Who Conduct an Informal Discount Busirl9ss. 
This method of discounting is widespread, but its impact in sales 
volume is felt less than that of other types of ''price-cutting" opera-
tions. The discounting of a set price in this manner is usually limited 
to the friends of the retailer. This type of operation does a. very 
2Gilchrist, Fo w., "The Discount House, 11 Journal of Marketing, Vol. 
17, (January, 1953), PP• 267-272. 
3rbid • ., p. 268. 
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substantial discount businass.4 
In addition to the above-mentioned types of discounters, there are 
.many smaller and less significant forms of discount house ope rations, 
but the types mentioned above account for the greatest volume of sales 
a.ttri~utable to discount houses; therefore, for the purpose of this 
study, those analyzed in the preceding paragraphs are sufficient. 
Although the discount houses may vary in types, their selling opera-
tions generally conform to a set pattern. 
Operating Characteristics of .Discount Houses 
Stephen Masters, P,resident of Masters, ::i:ncorporated, one of the 
nation's largest discount houses, explained how a discount house can 
sell below list prices and still .make a profit. He said that the for-
mula which his firm follows is low overhead, quick turnover, and smart 
b . 5 uying. 
Mr. Masters, in 1954, cited a comparison of his expense figures 
against the average department store I s figures. (Based on the National 
Retail Dry Goods Association's 1953 published report.} Quoting Mr. Masters: 6 
Expense Category 
Salary and Wages 
Store and Selling 
Warehousing and·. S11ipping 
Off ice and General 
Total Expenses 
4Ibid., P. 269. 












511nis count House Costs Explain Its Low Prices / 1 Business Week, 
October 30, 1954, p. 52. 
6corbin, A., "The Economics of :Oiscount Selling," Changing Pat-
terns in Retailing, ed. J. W. Wingate and A. Corbin, (Homewood, Illinois, 
1956),~p. 126-127. . 
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Thus for every $100 of sales, the department store'e.xpends $30.90, 
while Masters can do the same volume at a cost of only $11.20. Ob-
viously, Masters can operate on a 15 per cent margin and make a reason-
able profit, whereas a de pa.rtment store operating on a 15 per cent ma~ 
gin w~tild suffer a heavy loss, unless it could generate sufficient addi-
tional volume and cut its service enough to bring its expense ratio. into 
line. 7 
Extent of Discount Selling. 
Discount houses are found almost exclusivelf in cities of some size 
which have large retailing centers. Discounting does not make much di-
rectly loc,al inroaq.s in sma.l.ler towns, s.:gice J.oeal retailers cannot 
afford t0 grant aich favors without regular customrs soon finding out. 
Discount sales of major appliances represent over 25 per cent of tot al 
sales in many metropolitan areas.a 
.One estimate places the tctal number of discount houses between 
6,000: and 10,000.9 A airvey in New York disclosed seventy-seven dis-
count .houses and thirty-three wholesale establishments which make their 
~howrooms available to customrs of discount houses.10 
J;n 1955, the sales of the na.tion~:s largest discount house, .Polk 
Brothers ef C,hicago, were reported to be about $30 million a year.11 
7Ibid., p. 127. 
~ymond, .Robert .,s,., .. ".The Discount ,iouse and Fair Trade ,II The 
Penns.vlvania Business,Surve.v, .. Vol. 49, .No. 9, May 13, 1955, p. r;:-
9Breon, Hervert, "Discount Houses,'' Life, August 9, 1954, p. 52. 
1"aosenthal, H., .. ''Don't Discount the Discount Rouse,." Retailing 
Da.il.y, J:~ecember 7, 1948, p. 1. · 
11:aalph S. Alexander and Ric.hard M. Hill., ."Wha. t to Do .. About the 
,Qj;-$eount House, 11 Harvard, Business Review, VoL 33, (January, 1955), P• 53. 
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The National Retail Dry Goods Association claims that 95 per cent 
of all electrical appliance sales in New York City are made by discount 
houses. Retailing Daily reports that between 55 per cent and 70 per 
cent of !1h higher-priced electrical appliances are sold through dis-
count houses; and a large distributor of electrical appliances in Chicago 
declared that about 70 per cent of all electrical appliances sold in 
that city were distributed by dis-count houses .12 
Sources of Merchandise. 
The discount .house gets its merchandise for resale from whatever 
source it can. Some manufacturers are willing to sell to it directly. 
Many manufacturers, however, are too fearful of the resentment of their 
regular retailers to do so. Some manufacturers have established du.mmy 
distributors under the disguise of export houses, and the like, through 
which they can supply the discount house without appearing to do so. 
' 
Regular distrihutors, however, constitute one of the largest sources of 
supply to the discount house. Wholesale outlets are often a good source 
for the discounters, especially when the manufacturer has established a 
.high quota which the distributor must sell in order to retain his fran-
chise. So widespread is the practice of transshipping from wholesalers 
and retailers to discount houses that special agents, known as trans-
shippers, do a good business arranging such transactions.13 
Brands Sold. 
The usial brand preference patterns prevail in most of the discount 
12Ibid., P• 54. 
13 11The War on Price Cutting, 11 Business Week, July 5, 1952, pp. 40-
42. 
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houses. The discounters carry such well-known brands as RCA, Geraral 
EJ.e ctric, Westinghouse, Sunbeam, and Frigidaire. The discount ope rat or 
can ordirarily offer a larger reduction, for example, on a Sylvania or 
Crosley than he can offer on a Philco or an RCA television set. Conse-
quently, he will sometimes push brands in which he has confidence, but 
which have not achieved a high degree of consUJlE r acceptance. Only the 
14 
well-policed brands cannot be found at most discount houses. 
Customers Served. 
Some houses still place considerable emphasis on the identification 
card which they require the customer to have before he can buy, although 
usually such cards are issued by the house itself on the basis of infor-
mat ion supplied by the customer as to the name and address of his em-
ployer. The primary purpose of this requirement is probably to impress 
the customer with the notion that in being permitted to buy from the 
discount house, he is a member of a specially favored group. Many dis-
count houses serve all custoffi9 rs without any preliminary formalities at 
a11. 15 
Costs of Operation. 
Discount retailers seek to do away with services which large 
groups of cons1.l!ll3rs are willing to do without and to operate on the 
premise of reducing costs. In New York, Masters has been able to organ-
ize its operations so that three fourths of its employees are engaged 
in serving customers as compared with only about one half in the average 
1411Fair Trade Laws and Discount Selling," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 
64, (June, 1951), pp. 1327-1338 • 
. 
15Gilchrist, F. W., "The Dis count House, 11 Journal of Marketing, 
Vol. 17, (January, 1953), pp. 269-270. 
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department store. The combination of reduced costs and quick turnover 
.makes it possible for these concerns not only to sell at discounted 
prices but to operate profitably on a much smaller gross margin and 
16 
net profit than the regular retailer can afford. 
Invent or.v. 
Some houses carry little or no inventory. They sell from catalogs 
and advise customers who desire the merchandise to visit the nearest 
department store or wholesaler's showroom., obtain the desired informa-
tion., select the make and model they wish to buy, and report these identi-
fying· data to the discount house which will procure the merchandise to 
be picked up and paid for by the customer at a later date. Others carry 
display samples and either provide for delivery by a distributor or ob-
tain the goods from a distributor for later pickup by the consumer. 
However, .many others maintain co.mple te stocks. Practically all of them 
.make a point of delivering merchandise packed in the original factory 
sealed cartons as an assurance of quality •17 
Warranty and Repair Services. 
Since much of the merchandise sold by the discount house is mechan-
ical in nature, warranty, repair, and maintenance service are important. 
Most houses look upon the warranty as a .matter between the consumer and 
the manufacturer and have little or nothing to do with its practical 
details. The same is true of repair and maintenance service. The major-
ity of houses .make little effort to render such service. They take the 
16Brecher, E. M., "Discount Houses, How Can They Afford The Dis-
counts They Offer?" Consumer Reports, Vol. 14, (October., 1949), pp. 469-
472 •• 
17 
"Should You Buy From a Discount House?" Changing Times, Vol. 7, 
(October, 1953), p. 15. 
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position that the buyer must rely on the manufacturer's service instal-
lations or service facilities maintained by regular retailers to keep 
in working order the articles he buys from the discount house •18 
Location. 
Many discount houses operate in low-rent locations, often on the 
upper floors of office buildings; their furniture and fixtures are many 
tiines cheap, scant, and unattractive. Others carry on their business 
in locations that are adequate but out of the high-rent retailing dis-
t . t 19 ric, s. 
Auxiliary Services. 
Most discount houses give little of the service which is usually 
taken for granted as a part of the retailing tusiness, such as demon-
strations, deli very, and credit. An increasing number make arrangements 
for delivery, many making an extra charge for it. A very small number 
grant credit. A growing number make arrangements with banks or con-
sumer credit firms to finance their customers' purchases, probably be-
cause they have found this can become a lucrative phase of their opera-
t . 20 ions. 
Turnover. 
All discount houses strive for a rapid turnover. This is achieved 
primarily by the pr ice appeal. Many houses also seek to gain rapidity 
of turnover by limiting their stocks or carrying none at all. Since 
1811Target: Discounters," Hardware Age, March 29, 1956, pp. 60=64. 
1911Adventures in Shopping: The Discount House, 11 Sales Management, 
Vol. 73-?L~, June 15, 1954, pp. 42-44. 
20Gilchrist. F. W., 11The Discount House, 11 Journal of Marketing, 
Vol. 17, (January, 1953), pp. 267-272. 
24 
most of the items they handle exhibit a rather slow rate of turnover 
in the regular store, this is a very significant advantage. 
Reasons for Growth of Discount Houses 
Reasons Out of Manufacturers' Control. 
Much of the time since 1940 we have been in a sellers' .marketo 
Price competition at all levels of the distribution system has been 
sparse. In the last few years, the narket has switched in favor of the 
buyer. As a result, price competition has come into play. To be ex-
posed to such competition comes as a shock to many retailers unaccus-
tomed to it since the early 1940 1s. Furthermore, some retailers have 
never had such severe competition facing them. 
Through the ''fair-trade" laws, the Robinson-Patman Act and other 
devices, our judicial system has tried to sew up price competition, 
especially at the retail level. The discount house is one of the forces 
that was created, or came into being, .. as a result of an attempt to elim-
inate price competition in the competitive economy. 21 
Production has recently been catching up with demand. During 
World War II and the years immediately following, most nanuf acturers 
could sell all they could produce unless their products did not satisfy 
people's needs. In recent years, this situation has been reversed, and 
many manufacturers, especially of hard goods, have been faced with the 
problem of disposing of their output. As a result, many manufacturers 
have come to realize that if they are to market their products above 
the break-even point, they must sell through whatever outlet they can 
2\.alph S. Alexander and Richard M. Hill, "What to Do About the 
Discount House,n Harvard Business Review, Vol. 33, (January, 1955), p. 58. 
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move the goods into the hands of the consumer. The discount house has 
answered the need of the manufacturer, and as a result, many manufac-
turers have developed a friendly attitude toward the discounters. 22 
The consumers' reluctance to pay the increasingly rising prices has 
played its part also. Although personal incomes have been rising faster 
than prices, conswners are becoming disgusted with the constant price 
increases. Buying through discount houses has helped the consumer ease 
the situation. 23 
It is difficult to measure the worth of this next reason although 
it does have some significance. The greater amount of leisure time of 
the average worker brought about by legal limitations upon the number 
of work hours per week has given consumers more time to compare retail 
prices. It usually takes time to shop at a discount house. Often two 
trips are required to the discount house and one trip to the regular 
outlet to determine the brand and model desirect. 24 
Also, the redistribution of personal income during the past fifteen 
years has helped to clear the way for the discount house. As a result 
of the shift of the income from the higher-income to the middle-income 
groups, there is a concentration of buying power in the hands of people 
who have not been accustomed to the services with iNhich retail estab-
lishments have pushed their merchandise. Many of the members of this 
new middle-income group have been in the habit of buying in unattrac-
tive surroundings and of' carrying their purchases home with them. 
22 60. Ibid., p • 
. 
23Ibid., P• 60 
24Ibid., P• 61. 
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Therefore, they see no reason'·why they should pay more to buy in a 
pleasant atmosphere or to PBvT for services they do not particularly 
need. At the same time, those with higher incomes have felt the pres-
sure of progressive taxes on their income, and to broaden their pur-
chasing power, many of them have turned to the discount house for their 
purchases. 25 
The "do-it-yourself" fad has also had an effect upon the trend 
toward purchasing from discount houses. 'l'he experience consumers have 
had in buying food and other items in self-service supermarkets has 
·proven to the consumers their own ability to judge the quality of mer-
chandise. They have extended this ability into the semi-technical mer-
chandise such as appliances. 'rhe leisure time, previously imntioned, 
has also enabled consumers to make installations and do repair work which 
formerly they expected from the retailer.26 
Consumers have confidence in manufacturers' brands, and this has 
made it easier for the discount house to ~11 its products. An electric 
mixer with Sunbeam's name on it and in the original factory carton is 
the same whether purchased from a discount house or a franchised ~un-
beam dealer. 27 
Reasons Within 'Manufacturers I Control. 
Manufacturers have encouraged dealers to overstock by various sales 
promotion devices designed to push their products to the distributors. 
Dealers, when overstocked do not have a ready outlet for this surplusage 
25Ibid., p. 61. 
26Ibid., P• 62. 
27rbict., p. 63. 
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of products at regular prices. Quantity discounts have made it profit-
able for the medium-sized dealers ar:d small dealers to buy in the 
amounts necessary to earn the maximum. discount. They have to move this 
surplus either by cutting prices to their regular customers or by re-
selling at a small markup to a discount house. 28 I 
Another of the sales promotion devices is the quota system, whereby 
the dealer must dispose of a volwne fixed by the manufacturer in order 
to keep his franchise. In order to achieve his quota, the dealer some-
times sells to discount houses. 
The policy of overstocking dealers so they will try to move the 
particular manufacturer's brand rather than his competitor's, plus the 
heavy pressure on the manufacturer's salesmen to load up the dealers, 
in turn forces the retailers either to cut prices or to sell to a dis-
count house. 
Brands advertised widely by manufacturers help the discounter 
build his business. Consumers, thereby, rely on the manufacturer's 
product quality instead of the retailer.' s knowledge and judgn:ent for 
assurance of satisfaction in the use of the product.29 
The manufacturer's warranty or guarantee which. he has placed upon 
his product has given consumers confidence that faults in material and 
workmanship will be taken care of by the ms.nufacturer. This warranty 
gives the customer assurance that even though he buys through a dis-
count house he will receive guaranteed performance. Many discount 
houses take advantage of such warranty programs by telling customers 
28Ibid., p. 62. 
29Ibid., P• 63. 
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that they will, for a fee, arrange to have services perfonned. However, 
they further state that by taking the product to a certain repairman 
the customer may himself have the repair work done without payment of 
the middleman's fee.30 
When a manufacturer puts a new model of his product on the market, 
the retailer is under pressure to dispose of all the old models they 
have on hand; therefore they tend to dispose of the old models to dis-
count houses .31 
The attempts of the manufacturer to control the price at which his 
product is to be sold at retail is actually bem ficial to the discount 
house, whose chief selling appeal is price comparison. By fixing a 
retail price, the manufacturer provides a base price with which the dis-
count house price may be compared; he establishes a nregular" or "con-
ventional". price from which discounts can be allowed.32 
In many cases, manufacturers attempt to prescribe retail .margins 
which are more liberal than conditions justify and in so doing play into 
the hands of the discount house. Sometirr~s this is done with the idea 
of gaining the loyalty of the retailer and getting his cooperation in 
promoting the sale of the product. In other cases, it occurs as a re-
sult of failure to review such margins from time to time, or reluctance 
to ch~nge them to fit changing conditions. If retail margins are snall 
and cover only the reasonable cost of rendering the actual service which 
30ibid., P• 63. 
31Ibid., P• 64. 
32Ibid., p. 64. 
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the retailer performs plus a reasonable net profit, the discount house 
has little area within which to operate in granting allowances to its 
customerse It is one thing to offer a consumer a 30 per cent to 40 per 
cent discount for doing without the regular retailing services in his 
buying; it is an entirely different matter to ask him to do so for an 
allowance of 5 per cent or 10 per cent. 33 
It is obvious that the resale-price maintenance laws have actually 
aided the discount house. 
CHAPI'ER IV 
ENFORCEMENT OF RESALE-PRICE MAINTENANCE LAWS 
Proponents of resale-price maintenance laws say that discount 
houses violate the laws, inasmuch as they cut a manufacturer's estab-
lished price on his product which results in damage to the reputation 
of the manufacturer's product. 
Discounters do not deny the fact that they violate the resale-
price maintenance laws. These laws which appear to have brought pros-
perity to discount houses were enacted by forty-five of the forty-eight 
states ostensibly to eliminate such price-cutters. It is not a criminal 
offense to sell goods below the fixed price. The police depa.rtments, 
the county and state prosecuting attorneys, and other public officials 
have no authority to enforce price-maintenance laws. Instead, selling 
below the manufacturer's established price rest:imble s what is called a 
"tort" or a private injury to the manufacturer.1 
The decision of a manufacturer to fix the resale price of his 
product necessarily involves not only the choice of a resale pricing 
system but also the selection of an enforcement program designed to 
implement that choice. The wide range of possible enforcement policies 
and of variations in channels of distribution creates substantial dif-
ferences in marketing policies among those classified as 11fair-traders.u 
1 nFair Trade Laws and Discount Selling,1' Harvard~ Review, 
(June, 1951), pp. 1327-1338. 
30 
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As mentioned previously, resale-price control laws do not provide 
for enforcement by the public authorities. Any le gal action must be 
taken by individuals or corporations who believe they have been injured. 
Some manufacturers, such as Geraral Electric, establish special depart-
ments to enforce the price-m.'l.intenance programs. In other instances, 
trade associations assess dealers for funds to police the programs and 
prosecute violators. 
Enforcement Procedures 
The enforcement of resale-price arrangenents is based primarily on 
persuasion. Every effort is imde to convince discount sellers that the 
established price is necessary and beneficial. When persuasion fails, 
resort is made to litigation. In 1953, the Sunbeam Corporation sued 
·Masters, Incorporated of New York for selling certain appliances below 
Sunbeam's established resale prl ces. The court ordered Masters to pay 
Sunbeam $8,284.89 as follows: $330 for net profits .on discount sales; 
$3,404.56 for auditors' fees paid in examining Masterst books; $3,900.33 
for the legal services of.Sunbeam's attorneys; $650 for·Sunbeam's inves-
tigating costs. Also., Masters had to pay $1,316 for stenographic serv-
ices and $6,930 as a fee for the special Juror who heard the case. Mas-
ters own legal fee was $16,530.89.2 
Source of Complaints. 
Manufacturers receive complaints about violations of retail !'fair-
tradef' prices from three principal sources. Tte se sources are: the 
manufacturer's own salesmen, wholesalers, and retail competitors of the 
2Mund, Vernon A., Government and Business (2nd ed.)., (New York, 
1955), PP• 728-730. 
32 
alleged violator. Some consumers who have not been fortunate enough 
to purchase price-maintained goods at a discount sometimes submit com-
plaints to the .rnanuf acturer. The salesmen usually check counter prices 
and local newspaper advertisements in an area wh3 re maintained prices 
have been cut. Manufacturers, however, are usually reluctant to use 
their own salesmen to poll ce "price-cutting, 11 because then they cannot 
make as many calls a day as they normally would.3 
The largest source of complaints, however, is the individual re-
tailer or retailers' associations. Many retailers' associations in 
large cities actually engage in enforcement activities.4 
Complaints against 11 price-cutting11 come mostly from large cities 
and often come in cycles. The .manufacturers receive complaints from 
the larger cities constantly, and many mnufacturers feel that the vol-
wne of complaints does not accurately reflect the extent of resale-
price discounting in trase cities. Some retailers in these cities, 
however, are so accustomed to 11price-cutting 11 that many no longer bother 
to complain but meet competition by lowering their own prices. 5 
Disposition of Complaints. 
When the manufacturer receives a complaint, the procedure follOV11ed 
is fairly standard. A registered or certified letter is sent to the 
alleged violator telling him of the manuf acturer 1 s maintained resale 
prices, reqaesting that the cutting of th:l se maintained prices stop 
3c. I. Kanter and Stanford G. Rosenblum, "Operation of Fair Trade 
Programs, 11 Harvard Law Review, (December, 1955), p. 318. 
4Ibid., p. 318. 
5Ibid., p. 318. 
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immediately, and perhaps warning of eventual suit if the "price-cutting" 
does not stop. The violator is then "shopped" by an agent of the manu-
facturer who attempts to buy the product at a discount in order to sub-
stantiate the truth of the complaint. If the discounting has continued, 
either .a stern letter is sent to the violator, or he is contacted per-
sonally. In the personal contact, an effort is made to convince the 
retailer that a high profit margin is advantageous to him and to show 
him the risks of starting a price war; however, if persuasion appears 
likely to fail, a threat to cut off the retailer's supply of the product 
may occasionally be made. · (Some manufacturers never threaten s.ich ac-
tion, since they think such a threat mi ght violate the antitrust laws.) 
The alleged violator is then "shopped" again. If the price-cutting has 
continued, suit is brought. The time from receipt of a complaint until 
suit is usually two to eight months, but occasionally suit is very 
swift. 6 
Anticipation of Defenses . 
Since a manufacturer cannot predict which violations will require 
litigation, the standard procedure for ra.ndling complaints is not only 
designed to stop violations before a lawsuit, but it also serves to 
eliminate many possible defenses available to the discounter. The ma.nu-
facturer, by sending the first warning letter by registered mail, has 
evidence tra. t the discounter received notice of the established retail 
price. The manufacturer can a void the defense that a clerk charged th e 
wrong price by shopping the discounter-defendant's store several times. 
6Rosenblum. M. P., "Efficiency Makes Transshipping Streamlined 
Distribution Method, 11 Retailing Daily, June 10, 1952, p. l. 
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Since the retailer is not bound by "fair-trade II prices on merchandise 
purchased by him without notice of tre se prices, most manufacturers 
usually shop the di.scounter until he has received the registered letter 
and thereafter bought new merchandise.? 
Enforcenent Action Available. 
Resale-price maintenance can be enforced or resale-price violations 
may be remedied by two types of action. One is an action for damages 
for breach of the resale-price maintenance contract. This type of ac-
tion is available only to a party to such a contract. Its purpose is 
to recover a monetary loss incurred because of a p:i.rty selling a "fair-
traded" commodity at a price less than that established in the resale 
contract and is available to either of the p:i.rtie s. Suits can be based 
on contractual liabi lity in any state or locality in which the contract 
is legal. 8 
The second type of action is for injunctive relief and is based 
upon the unfair competition provision of the state resa le-price main-
tenance laws. Although damages may be recovered in such actions, the 
main purpose of this type of le gal proceeding is to enjoin present and 
future violations of tre maintained re sale prices. .In the essence, the 
resale-price maintenance laws provide that: 
"Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or sell-
ing any coillllodi ty at less than the price stipulated in any contract 
entered into pursuant to the resale-price mai ntenance law, whether the 
person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a 
party of such contract, is unfair competition." 
7c. I. Kanter and Stanford G. Rosenblum, "Operation of Fair Trade 
Programs, 11 Harvard Law Review, (December, 1955), p. 310. 
811Fair Trade Enforcement Suits, 11 Trade Regulation Reports, ( Comme rce 
Clearing House, 1954), pp. 4721-4722 . 
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Such unfair competition may be enjoined or a damage suit may be based 
thereupon. The usual remedy under this provision is injunctive relief. 
It is under this provision that persons who have not signed a resale-
price maintenance contract but who have not ice of the maintained price 
can be forced to adhere to the restrictions of pri ce maintenance con-
tracts between other persons.9 
Suit Against Discounters. 
The only persons who can maintain an action for breach of the 
resale-price maintenance contracts are the parties to the contract. 
However, an action based upon the unfair competition provisions of the 
state resale-price maintenance laws can be brought by any person da.ae.ged. 
Therefore, the owner of the trade-mark or a person in c001petition sell-
ing the same product may bring suit. This may be the manufacturer, dis-
tributor, molesaler, or retailer.10 
Under a nonsigner clause, the cause of action against any person 
violating the maintained price is in the nature of a "tort" for unfair 
competition. Sin:e this cause of action is given to any person damaged 
by ''price-cutting," the courts have allowed retailers as well as manu-
facturers to sue. Some manufacturers who do not wish to rely entirely 
on the nonsigner clause distribute their products exclusively to whole-
salers who contract to sell only to retailers signing price-maintera.nce 
contracts with the manufacturers. (The McGuire Act specifically author-
izes such a practice when state statutes permit.) A manufacturer may 
also have a cause of action against nonsigning retailers for interference 
9Ibid., pp . 4721-4722. 
lO"Fair Trade Enforcement Suits," 1'.mQ& Regulation Reports, (Com-
merce Clearing House, 1954), p. 4721. 
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with advantageous relations when he .rmintai ns such a system of contracts. 
The manufacturer· nia.y have this cause of action, since a nonsigner in 
order to obtain merchandise possibly induced some wholesaler or retailer 
to break his contract with the manufacturer.11 
Enforcement Difficulties 
Dis counting of products under the jurisdiction of resale-price 
maintenance laws is hard to detect because discount houses do not ordi-
narily advertise their bargains and usually sell only to customers whom 
they can identify. Furthermore, the cost of policing these violations 
is very expensive to the manuracturer. An example of this is the 
Sheaffer Pen Company who spent two million dollars over a period of two 
years and discontinued selling to some 700 dealers because of their dis-
count practiceso However, the cost was high, as evidenced by a decrease 
in sales for the first half of 1955 of 9.5 per cent as compared with the 
same period in 1954. Earnings for the same period decreased 35 per 
cent •12 
In addition to this, there is the possibility of undesirable pub-
licity for the distributor who enforces higher priceso Distributors in 
many cases have little or no enforcement help from manufacturers be-
cause the discount houses provide the manufacturer with a means of dis-
tributing their expanded output in a buyers' market. Resale-price main-
tenance is particularly difficult to enforce when the manufacturer sells 
11c. I. Kanter and Stanford G. Rosenblwn, nOperation of Fair Trade 
Programs," Harvard Law Review, (December, 1955), po 318. 
1211Retreat of the Fair-Trader, 11 Time, December 19, 1955, p. 90. 
through wholesalers and has no continuous direct contact with all his 
13 dealers. 
Ineffectiveness of Lawsuits Against 11 Prlce-Cutters." 
Court suits to enforce compliance with "fair-trade" laws are far 
from effective because the damages levied against discounters are not 
large enough to make them discontinue selling at less than stipulated 
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prices. An example of policing difficulties is exemplified in the case 
of General Electric which hired the services of five Pinkerton detectives 
to investigate the selling activities of New York City discount houses 
selling General Electric's automatic electric blankets at an average of 
$6.84 below the minimum retail prices designated by the company. The 
net effect of two years of detective work and legal action was $650 in 
fira s and a general resolution on tre part of discount houses to be more 
careful about selling General Electric goods to Pinkerton detectives •14 
In 1955, General Electric filed 853 suits against discounters. But 
despite General Electric 1 s policing efforts, discount houses have con-
tinued to sell General Electric I s products at a discount •15 So profit-
able has the violation of resale-price maintenance laws been that dis-
counters are willing to pay µ; riodic fines as a regular cost of doing 
16 
business. 
l3Corey, Raymond, '''Fair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal, 11 The Har-
vard Business Review, September 10, 1952, p. 50. 
14Brecher, E. M., "Discount Houses, How Can They Afford the Dis-
counts They Offer?" Consumer Reports, (October., 1949), p. 471. 
15 11G. E. 1 s Heavy Blow at the Discounters," Newsweek, January 9, 
1956, P• 53.° 
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Consumers Uncooperative in Providing P.roof of Violation b.v Retai.le rs. 
Because scattered violations of price-maintenance laws are hard to 
detect, the cooperation of the consumer in reporting these violations 
to the manufacturer is necessary. 'the consuners, however, do not natur-
ally have an incentive to report these violations to the ma.nuf acturer 
for action because the reduced prices are of obvious bemfit to the 
price-conscious consumer. 'l'he consumer who is unfortunate in not pos-
sessing an admission card to a discount house is the most likely con-
sumer to report such violators. However, these persons are usually 
unable to provide proof of the discounter's violation.17 Furthermore, 
discounting is becoming so vd.despread that almost anyone can purchase 
price-maintained goods at a discount. 
Piscordance in Resale-Price Maintenance Legislation. 
The fact that all states have not adopted price-maintenance laws 
has created discordance in court decisions. These court decisions per-
tain to the loophole of price-maintained items involved in shipment 
between states not having resale-price laws and a state which does have. 
A second loophole pertains to the resale-price laws I most powerful weap-
on., the nonsigner clause. 
Resale-price maintainad goods involved in interstate commerce. 
There is a legal question of whether a discount house can use a state 
where there is no price-maintenance statute as a base· of ope rations 
from which to advertise and mip 11fair-traded 11 items into a 11 fair-trade 11 
1611Fair Trade Laws and Discount Selllng., 11 Harvard Law Review, 
(June, 1951), p. 1328. 
17Ibid • ., P• 1330. 
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state at discounted prices. 'rhe courts have placed interstate commerce 
above the price-maintenance laws. The proponents of resale-price main-
tenance tried to plug this loophole by saying that such statutes of one 
state apply to goods shipped into another. However, several discount 
houses have set up offices in states not having these laws and are doir:g 
a large -mail-order business in price-maintained goods without effective 
court action against them. 18 
The other loophole in the price-maintenance laws centers around 
the nonsigner clause which makes it mandatory for all retailers of 
identical products in the state to abide by a manufacturer's list price 
if one retailer in the same state agrees to do so. 
Legalit,v of the nonsigner clause. The McGuire Act states that 
retailers not signing a resale-price maintenance contract have to abide 
by stipulated prices; however, several state courts have held that a 
retailer who does not actually sign a resale-price contract does not 
have to abide by maintained prices. To date, thirteen states have either 
ruled their resale-price maintenance laws unconstitutional or have handed 
down decisions making the laws inoperative. Courts have often refused 
to grant injunctions against nonsigner-discounters unless the manufac-
turer can show that he has diligently tried to police his distribution 
system., 19 
When the Supreme Court in the Schwegmann Case held that the 
1811Price War _Counterattack, n Busim ss Week, September 4, 1954, 
P• 135. 
19c. I. Kanter and Stanford G. Rosenblum, "Operation of Fair Trade 
Programs,'' Harvard Law Review, (December., 1955), p. 321. 
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:Miller-Tydings Act did not exempt nonsigner clauses from the antitrust 
and unfair-competition laws, Congress retaliated by passing the McGuire 
Act. The Supreine Court has several times refused, on grounds of lack 
of a substantial federal quest ion, to hear appeals challenging the con-
stitutionality of the McGuire Act. Although no states have repealed 
their laws., several state courts have recently held the nonsigner clauses 
invalid under state constitutions. Nonsigne rs a re now bound by maintained 
resale prices in about thirty-two states. 20 
The following discussion of marketing considerations brings forth 
the underlying factors that make ineffective the resale~price enforce-
ment machinery. 
20weston., Glen E., "Resale Price Maintenance and Market Integra-
tion: F'air Trade or Foul Play?" George Washington Law Review .'I Vol. 22, 
(June, 1954), p. 675. 
CHAPI'ER V 
MA.RKETING CONSIDERATIONS 
For some manufacturers, enforcement of resale-price maintenance 
laws is not economically expedient. Some lack the financial capacity 
to bear the expense of a resale-price maintenance enforcement prcg ram 
as well as the heavy consumer-advertising prcgram which is necessary 
to control the resale price of certain types of products. Some manu-
facturers do not maintain the resale price of their products, because 
they believe such an approach is impractical or inferior to price com-
petition at the retail level. They are willing to direct their market-
ing programs primarily toward the price consciousness of consumers. 
Their decision is founded on the theory that the manufacturert s .,selling 
,; 
price is not greatly affected by retail discounting or that, since a 
lower retail price will usually produce a larger volwne of sales, prof-
its may be greater than they would be if the product were 11price-
maintained. 11 These manufacturers believe that the gain to be derived 
from selling whenever and wherever possible outweighs the possible .ad-
vantages of a resale-price maintenance programo 1 
Some writers say that the growth of the discount house resulted 
from the discounters cutting "fair-trade" prices while most retailers 
were maintaining these prices. But the fact is that 11 fair-trade 11 goods 
1c. L Kanter and Stanford G. Rosenblum, 110peration of Fair Trade 
Programs, 11 Harvard Law Review, (December, 195 5) , p. 340. 
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usually comprise only a very small part of the stock of discount houses, 
and the presence of numerous discount houses in areas not under the 
jurisdiction of price-maintenance laws indicates that their success is 
attributable partly to the publicts willingness to accept fewer services 
than are provided by some other retailers. Their success may also stem 
from the use by discount houses of more efficient merchandising tech-
niques which reduce overhead. Nevertheless, since the public is likely 
to be familiar with the designated, or Hlist, 11 price of resale-price 
maintained products, discounting on such products probably only enhances 
the di. scount house 1 s re put at.ion for offering bargains on all merchan-
dise. 
The Mechanics of Distribution 
Historically, progress toward higher living standards was .rrade 
through more efficient production and technological progress. There-
fore, the distribution system bas been under little pressure to change 
its basic form. Although it is true that periods of depression have 
resulted in temporarily lower profits and higher rates of business fail-
ures among retailers, the basic structure of the distribution system 
had remained almost unchanged before the close of World War II. The 
structure of the distribution system followed a fixed p.3-ttern. Raw ma-
terials were converted into a finished product by a manufacturer or a 
series of manufacturers. They were then shipped to a jobber or whole-
saler where they were sold and reshipped to a retailer. Finally, they 
were sold to the ultimate consumer. Each step in this process from 
raw material to consumer involved additions to basic cost represented 
by the expense of handling plus profit. Although each step in the 
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distribution process was a necessary function in the distribution mech-
anism., the system as a whole was inefficient in terms of the relation-
ship between the actual cost of goods and their final price to the con-
sumer. 2 
Shortly after the end of World War I, a few retailers, inspired by 
the customary profit motive, recognized the possible berefits of the 
volume-purchasing power vtlich might accrue to a retailer who operated 
a group of storeso The result of this recognition was the development 
of the chain store, although some chain stores had previously been 
known. One of the significant aspects of the chain store was its vir-
tual elimination of the jobber and wholesaler in the chain~store seg-
ment of the distribution process. Manufacturers 6 ould now sell their 
products directly to retailers and thus eliminate one step in the ban-
dling of merchandise and also one sharer in the profits. Some of the 
saving thus obtained was ultimately passed on to the consumer in the 
form of lower prices, thus providing an advance in living standards as 
the result of increased efficiency in the distribution system. The opera-
tion of chain stores was not prevalent in all fields. Goods such as elec-
trical appliances, furniture, jewelry, china and glassware, household 
goods, sporting goods, and automobiles were still sold by manufacturers 
to ind.iv idual retailers to be resold at advertised prices) 
At the end of World War II, the backlog of consumer demand for mer-
chandise which had been scarce was quickly exhausted by two factors. 
2 James, Anthony, 11 Conswner Revolution," Journal of Property Manage-
ment, (Spring, 1950), po 188. 
3Ibido' p O 189 0 
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First, there had been a tremendous increase in the productive capacity 
of th-e United States, both during and a1ortly after the war. Second, 
wartime and postwar inflation caused sharply higher prices and thus 
cut into the effective purchasing power of the consumer. Both of these 
factors cmbine d to produce a technical oversupply of most goods by the 
end of the year 1948, and of nearly all goods by the end of 1949. This 
was particularly true as applied to less-favored brands of goods. It 
was thus that the consumer revolution began.4 
The Consumer Revolution 
By the consumar revolution is meant the determination of the con-
Sl..lliflr to maintain and broaden his real purchasing power--even at the 
expense of convenience, comfort, and buying ha bi ts. 
An example of the consumer revolution is exemplif.ie d in the C-54, 
an airplane used by the army during the Second World war. This plane 
was known by comroorcial airlines as the DC-4. It was an aircraft whose 
worth was proved by millions of miles of safe flying. At the end of 
the war., the large airlines purchased these planes and put them to work 
on their regularly scheduled lines. The large airlines had spent thou-
sands of dollars advertising these airplanes; therefore, the civilian 
public was sold on their reliability. Furthermore, thousands of veter-
ans were sold on the plane through their own wartime experiences with 
this aircraft. Since the United States Bureau of Civil Aeronautics 
strictly supervises both the flight personnel and the mechanical main-
tenance of all United States aircraft., and since all aircraft in flight 
4Ibid • ., p. 190. 
over government controlled and maintained airways are likewise under 
close supervision, it mi.de little difference wr:ether one rode with 
one airline or another. All were flying identical airplanes over 
identical routes under ma:lerately identical operating conditions. 
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Whereas individual company policies rnight vary, certain minimum safety 
standards were required. Recognizing this basic standardization., ven-
turesome young men purchased some of these aircraft and set themselves 
up in bus ire ss as nonscheduled airlines" By send.i..ng out their planes 
only when well filled, by crowding more passengers into the same sp9.ce, 
and by eliminating some of the frills of deluxe service., they reduced 
travel fares to an amazingly low level. 'l'his is an example of the funda-
mentals of the consumer revolution; a standard product and a standard 
value available at a sharply lower cost but often at a considerable sac-
rifice in comfort and convenience .5 
So great was the public response to ''discount" air travel that 
almost every major airline is now offering so-called air-~oach travel. 
The air-coach revolution in travel standards and costs is only one srnall 
example. The same trend is going on in a.lJnost every segment of the econ-
omy where standard merchandise of advertised and gemrally known value 
is availableo 
Also, during the war, millions of members of the armed forcBs 
caught a glimpse of what might happen in a conswner revolution through 
their purchases at Post Exchange (PX) Stores. They carried this experi-
ence in their minds after they- re turned to civilian life" 
As merchandise became plentiful in the postwar period, there were 
5rbi ct • ., P. 191. 
~-6 
men in fields other than airlines who recognized that standard products 
and standard values could be made available to consumers at below the 
regularly advertised retail price. If people would risk their lives 
in airplanes simply because the,y were stan:iardized, they would surely 
buy standard brand merchandise through new channels. If people would 
sacrifice personal comfort and convenience to save mone,y in travel, 
they would certainly do the same thing to get a ·washing machine or a 
wrist watch at lower _prices. 
Social and Economic Changes 
Newton's Law of Action and Reaction is a powerful natural law 
which cannot be legislated out of ext stence. Periods of economic ad-
justment are not just accidents. Such r.;eriods usually develop out of 
excesses practiced during periods of scarcity as well as periods of 
plenty. Businessmen become too "bullisho 11 They may misjudge the 
future. They frequently overestimate their ms.rkets and the size of the 
consum3rs 1 pocketbooks. So when demand slackens, a reaction sets in 
6 
and soon almost everybody cuts prices to move the products. 
In recent years, several significant changes have come over our 
economy and our society. In the first place, to an increasing extent 
we rave moved over from emphasis on production in our economy to a 
heavy stressing of consumption. _ Prosperity is increasingly dependent 
on expanding conswner purchasing power. To meet this end, we bave devel-
oped an extensive system of consunEr financing and a broad program of 
consumer welfare. Producers are no longer thought of as bern factors but 
6Babson, Roger W • ., 11Fair Price, 11 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 
March 11, 1954, p. 1107. 
as beneficiaries. The consu.rrer is now the benefactor.? 
Also, the rise of the "common mant' has contributed to the change 
in the economy. Since the "common man" is the conswrer in a mass-
production society, he has come to recognize his importance and his 
place in the economy. Out of these feelings has grown the conswner's 
belief that he is entitled to a higher standard of living.8 
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During the time in which these political and economic changes were 
taking place in the United States., a combination of circumstances in 
several lines created a slow-down in the movement toward more lower-
cost f['Oduction. This was due partially to a decrease in the rate of 
improvement in technology. However, the principal causes were more 
effective .labor organization and a higher level of taxation. The in-
creased taxes not only increased the direct cost of 610ods, but also 
( through income taxes) discouraged the activities of nprofit-hungry11 
producers. ,In 1rany classifications of production it appeared as though 
wider distribution could not be attaire d through lower costs of produc-
tion. This meant that higher living standards, in many cases, must 
come out of increased conswner income or out of more efficient distri-
bution. Since higher incomes can c~ne only from increased production, 
a likely way to broadened consumption is more efficient distribution. 9 
The Arrerican population has an income of about $)340 billion, with 
personal conswnption expenditures reaching :ff,270 billion. Today, accord-
ing to the Dep9.rt1rent of Labor, the average family of four persons 
7James, Anthony, HConswner Revolution, 11 Journal of Propert,y Manage-
ment, (Spring, 1950), p. 186. 
8rbid., p. 187. 
9Ibid., p. 188. 
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should be spending approximately $4,200 a year to maintain a minimum 
standard of living on a basis of health and decency. Yet 63 per cent 
of all families in the United States have a total money income of under 
f5,000 a yearo In fact, 1,000 families with incomes of $10,000 a year 
and over spend as much for consumer g(Q)ods and services as do 3,281 
families with incomes between ~P4,000 and }!f,5,000, or 4.,111 families with 
incomes between ~~3 ,OOO and $4,000.10 Even so., income disparity is be-
coming less significant than was once the case. 
'I'he consuitar is often mortgaging his future income to secure the 
automobiles, appliances, clothing, homes, and other goods and services 
he wants. He has gone into debt by an amount of $40 billiono By this 
process of .lifting himself up by his bootstraps, the consu.rrE r is able 
to extend or accelerate the utilization of his buying power by a sum 
which exceeds 10 per cent of the total income. 11 
To the extent t.ha. t the c onswner has a share in the national pros-
perity and in maintaining the boom, he has the task of buying, using, 
wasting, and destroying a constantly increasing vo lwne of {!J) ods. The 
gross national product in 1939 amounted to $91 billion, but in 1955, 
it reached $390 pi Llion. We are now producing at the rate of well over 
~\400 billion annually. Between 1947 and the present, the fixed invest-
ment of American business in commercial and ind us trial construction 
amounted to some $75 billion, while producers I durable equipment, which 
means productive ma chine ry and modern labor-saving devices, amounted to 
lOLebow, Victor, "Crisis in Retailing," Journal of Retailing, 
(Spring, 1957), PP• 17-55. 
ll Ibid • , p • 18 • 
over $220 billion. Thus a popu.l.a tion whose inoome may not be rising 
fast enough is faced with the necessity of consuming a great deal of 
merchandise being produced at a constantly accelerated pace. 
Considerations for Changes in the Nature of Competition 
For decades the pricing system in many United States industries 
has been based on a system of '.'functional discounts'.' which are speci-
fied allowances for performance of specified functions at each level 
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of distribution. The retailer gets a certain allowance for his contri-
bution to the distribution of goods. For his contribution--bulk buying, 
holding of inventory, reselling to dealers--the distributor gets another 
amount. •rraditionally, the manufacturer starts by setting a retail list 
price and working backward from this, giving discounts for services. ren-
dered at each distributive level. This situation was recognized and 
written into law by the Robinson-.Patman Act about twenty years agoJ2 
General Electric, in expressing its action in its decision to dis-
continue factory-set retail prices said, 11yvhe n you set a retail price, 
you hold an umbrella over the weaker portion of your distribution sys-
tem. 11 In the past few years., the nature of the competition in the appli-
ance industry has changed markedly. These are some of the considerations 
t od.ay. 13 
Mass Production. 
Appliance makers, like the automobile makers, have forced into the 
1211Who Is Going to Set the Price?", Business Week, November 27, 
1954, P• 26. 
1311The War on Pr.ice Cutting., 11 Business Week, July 5, 1952., pp. 40-
market the vast quantity of goods they must manufacture in order to 
keep the mass-production system working right. The existence of a 
surplusage of goods has been brought about by manufacturers forcing 
goods on distribut-0rs, who in turn must force them on to retailers. 11+ 
Discount Houses. 
These are the inevitable product of the foregoing system. Manu-
facturers 1nust have big low-cost volume. the discount houses give it 
50 
to them, so they can I t do much a bout fighting the discount house. These 
"discounters 11 have helped to slash marketing costs of appliances .15 
Inventories. 
Dealers are reluctant to buy in large quantities because it is 
expedient for them to let the manufacturer or distributor assume the 
burden of holding inventories. 'fhe fast transportation system of today 
permits the retailer to let the manufacturer hold the stock until it is 
needed.16 
Mixed Carload.Shipments. 
Dealers who have big enough volwne are ordering mixed carloads 
of appliances straight from the factory. In such cases, distributors 
17 become mere order-takers. 
Trade-in Transactions. 
As with the automobile business, the very eY.istence and variability 
of ntrade-ins 11 makes it virtually impossible for any manufacturer to 
police prices .18 
l4Ib'd l .• ' pp. 40-42. 
l5Ibid., pp. 40-42. 
16Ibid., PP• 40-42. 
l7Ibid., pp. 40-42. 
18 
Ibid., PP• 40-42. 
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Trends in Retail Distribution 
Some schools of thought believe that discount houses are here to 
stay and are strong evidence that soIIBthing is drastically wrong with 
the present distribution system and current retail-profit margins. 
This group maintains that under the free enterprise system discounters 
are entitled to as much opportunity as any other businessmen. 
The real problem, according to Paul H. Bolton, executive vice-
president of the National Association of Wholesalers, is not the dis-
count house but the "discount function." Bolton argoo s that: 
"We must educate both manufacturers and the public to understand 
that our economic future and our Am3rican way of life have become the 
envy of the world--through our present competitive profit system. The 
function of granting cuts from established list prices will undermine 
our economics, set us back to the old price haggling of t he European 
marketplace of the Dark Ages unless we wake up. 1119 
Victor Lebow, in a recent article in the Journal of Retailing said, 
"Upon the American consumer is concentrated a heavy propaganda bar-
rage employing every trick arrl appeal ingenuity can devise. With $10 
billion a year going into newspapers, magazines, radio, and television 
advertisements, the American has been t ransforIIB d into a creature whose 
chief function in life is to consume. 1120 
It is in the conflict between retailers over who gets the consumer's 
dollar that a great many of the casualties in retailing result. 
Between the decline of resale-price maintenance and the rise of the 
discount house, price competition must increase. This trend will prob-
ably be further heightened by the enormous inventories and the high rate 
of production based on present industrial capabilities. 
1911should Manufacturers Cut the Flow of Me rchandise into Discount 
Houses?" Tide, September 25, 1954, p. 31. 
20Lebow, Victor, "Crisis in Ret ailing, " J ournal of Retailing, 
(Spring, 1957), p. 23. 
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The rising level of prices, particularly in relation to the lower 
rate of increase in consumer purchasing power, puts a premium upon 
aggressive merchandising. New automobiles, new hom9s, new furniture, 
and new foodstuffs are all higher in price. Because these purchases 
leave less of the consumer's income available for further expenditures 
and because so .many of them involve installment buying arid the mortgag-
ing of future income, it is pretty safe to guess that the physical vol-
ume of goods sold in the near future may well be lower than at present 
levels. Quite possibly the higher price level will soon force a decline 
in the physical volume of merchandise sold. 21 Certainly, inflation is 
seriously threatening the real purchasing capacity of substantial seg-
ments of our society. 
Two contradictory trends in retail distribution are presently being 
observed. 
One is the drive for higher markups, spurred by the steadily mount-
ing expenses. 'fhe other is the demonstration that even with merchandise 
that has always sold at fixed and traditional mrkups, it is possible to 
shrink the margins drastically. This proof is offered by the increasing 
number of discount operations in many fields.22 
Given the dynamics of the trAmerican Star:dard" of consumption, the 
plain fact is that the retailers frequently represent, in effect., the 
chief bottleneck in the flow of goods from producer to consumer. They 
get the largest single slice of that 60 cents or so out of the consumer's 
dollar that pays for the cost of distribution. 
21Ibid., P• 24. 
22Ibid • , p • 21. 
23Ibid., p. 25. 
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Decision to Buy at Discount 
Discount buying is same trouble for the shopper. He must first be 
admitted to a buying group that has the contact with the discount house. 
Then he must usually pick up his selections and pay cash for his pur-
chase. On small items the saving often may not be worth the trouble. 
If he changes his mind, he cannot always return the goods. There is 
usually a question of whether he is protected against faulty merchan-
dise. There is also the problems of style, prestige, and institutional 
backing--all of which are generally lacking in discount merchandise. 
On the other hand., there is plenty of evidence that most Arne rican 
citizens will go to almost any ends to obtain and maintain a higher 
level of consumption. An example is the thousands of women who fill 
full-time jobs in office and factory then returning home to the pre-
sumably full-time job of wife and homemaker. In most of the cases, 
their only reason for this added burden is to obtain a higher living 
standard. The inconvenience of searching out discounts to stretch ex-
penditures is one which will cheerfully be endured as compared with the 
added work loado 
CHAPI'ER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Nature of the Problem Swnrna.rized 
! 
The resale-price maintenance laws authorize manufacturers to es-
tablish the retail list price of their trade-marked products. The dis-
count houses violate the provisions of these laws inasmuch as they re-
duce the manufacturers I stipulated prices below the designated minimum. 
The enforcement machinery could minimize discount house operations 
if there were a concerted effort by manufacturers to do so. There are 
two types of action available to enforce resale-price violations. One 
is an action for damages for breach of the resale-price maintenance 
contract, the other is for injunctive relief. 
The enforcement attempts meet many difficulties, however. .Dis-
counting is often hard to detect. Also, the cost of policing the distri-
bution system is expensive to the manufacturer. In addition, there is 
the possibility of undesirable publicity for the distributor who enforces 
higher prices. Enforcement is particularly difficult when the manufac-
,· 
turer sells through wholesalers and has no continuous direct contact 
with all his dealers. 
In many cases, even though the discounter is swnmoned to court, the 
court suits to enforce compliance with the laws are not effective because 
the fines are not large enough to discourage discounting. 
Consumers do not ordinarily have an incentive to report discount 
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sales to manufacturers for actiono Those who do attempt to report vio= 
lations of the price laws are usually unable to provide proof of such 
violations .. 
There are loopholes in the laws which have created discordance in 
court decisions and further hampered enforcement procedures. One of 
these loopholes centers around the court decisions pertaining to price-
maintained goods involved in interstate commerce. The other loophole 
pertains to the nonsigner clause 9 which is the resale-price .laws u most 
powerful weapono 
The source of the manufacturers I enforcement difficulties is prin= 
cipally the discount house o The discount houses came into existence 
because of combinations of the following reasons~ 
1. There has been an increase in price competition at all levels of the 
distribution systemo 
2$ Production has recently been catching up with demand. The discount 
houses have been able to dispose of the manufacturers O surpluses o 
3. The redistribution of personal income during the past several years 
has helped pave thEl way for the discount house .. 
4e The conswners I reluctance to pay the increasingly rising prices has 
played its part also o Buying through discount houses has helped the 
e;onswner ease; this situation. 
5.. The trend toward 11 do-it=yourself 11 products has enabled the conswner 
to make installations and repairs which formerly he expected from 
the retailer.. This trend has fit in well with the discount houses' 
pattern of operationso 
6 o Consurnsrs have confidence in manufacturers' brands, which has made 
it easier for the discount house to sell its products. This 
exemplifies the fundamental foundation of discount operations.11 which 
is a standard value available at a lower cost and mny times at a 
sacrifice in comfort and convenience. 
The philosophy of the discount house=-price competition=-is not a 
nErn phenomenon, but is as old as the competitive system. 'l'he only thi.rg 
new is the particular form it has takene Discount houses began just 
about the time of the first price-maintenance laws in the 1930 1 s. They 
started as small operations catering to a small clientele who had to 
have special identification cards. 
Men and women while in the service became accustomed to purchases 
below the list price through the Post ,Exchange Stores and sought out 
discount purchases after they returned to civilian life. 
furthermoN, people take pride in telling their neighbors that 
they purchased a well-known brand product at a discount. T1hey take 
pridlll also in telling their neighbors where they, tooj may buy at a 
discount. A pers·on'·s de-sire to prove to others that he has ,"contacts 11 
has increased the prominence of discount houses. 
The chain store brought about the realization on the part of many 
consumers that the elimination of middlemen in the distribution system 
would result in a lower price to the consumer. The chain stores 1 lowered 
prices made the conswners critical of the distribution cost of some prod-
ucts a 
It can be seen that the enforcement machinery has not curbed the 
discount house operationso The reasons for the breakdown of enforcement 
procedures.I> however, are not inherent in the enforcement techniques. 
Rather.I> it is a result of the change in the natuN of the market. 
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At the end of World War II there was a great demand for consumer 
goodso However, tm rupply soon caught up with the demand and surpluses 
were created. Mass-production requires mss-distribution techniques. 
The manufacturers were in need of a type of outlet that could profitably 
distribute the products to the public at a price the public was willing 
to payo The discount house satisfied the requirements of the manufac-
turers. This t,ype of retail outlet placed the manufacturers in a posi-
tion of determining whether they viant.ed the volwne the discount house 
could provide or of risking loss of sales to comp3 tit ors by continuing 
distribution to con~umers through franchised dealers at stipulated priceso 
The enforcement machinery has "Worked effectively in the past when 
the discount houses did not enjoy the prosperit,v they do today. 
Many factors have been at work in the economy for the past several 
years that have created changes in the market. A revolution by con-
sumers to broaden their purchasing power started the movement toward 
reduced prices on price-maintained goodso 
At the time that the nconswner revolution" was gaining momentum-9 
several social and economic changes were taking place. We moved from 
emphasis on production in our economy to a stressing of consL1I11ption. 
·ro meEat this end we developed an extensive system of consum3r financing 
and a broad program of consumer "Welfare o The changes all led to one 
end result and, that was a transition from a sellers i to a buyers I mar= 
ket@ 
Conclusions 
Th@ basic hypothesis of this study was that a breakdown of the 
resale=price maintenance J.B.ws was a result of the change from a sellers 1 
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to a buyers' market. In short, the retailer is no longer the benefactor:1 
but the beneficiary. The conswner is now the benefactor. 
Policing and enforcement is primarily left to the manufacturer, but 
he has little incentive to push the enforcement too far, because the 
discount house is a profitable outlet for the manufacturer. The distri,-
butors find discount houses a ready outlet for any surpluses they might 
have. The retailers realize that consumers are becoming more reluctant 
to pay the list price. rharefore, with the exception of a few industries 
with strong organizations, such as the drug industry, there is little 
encouragement of enforcement today. 
The nature of the market is not such that policing groups find 
enforcement of maintained prices expedient. Therefore, to this extent 
the enforcement of the laws is ineffective and discount houses continue 
to iXist and flourish. 
,In view of thlilse conclusions, the reader may wonder if we have more 
discounting today than we have had in the past even though the market 
today is IIDre favorable for the discounter. 
There are many reasons why we do not have an answer to this ques-
tion. The volume of consumer sales, both per capita and quantitative 
total , in monetary and real terms, has increased so much in the last 
fifty years that any sort of comparison is likely to go astray. More-
over, the problem is complicated by the fact that the total volume has 
changed during the period, but by how much no one knows. .The short spm 
of most of our statistical series does much to hamper research in re-
tailing. The Bureau of the Census 9 for example :i did not begin its 
annual estimates of total retail sales for this country until 1935. 
Most of our retail information is grouped according to stores classified 
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in terms of th@ir principal merchandise lines instead of by any kind of 
business or by price policy o Also J most of the figures on discounting 
have emanated from extremely partisan sources o Even though some people 
may be proud of their ability to buy at a discount, consumer studies of 
discounting are hampered by the fact that many oth@rs are inclined to 
be rather secretive about it o Furthermore, no two students of discount-
ing seem to have agreed upon definitions o 
If discounting goes to the point of a complete breakdown of the 
price structure;) we may ni;rt have a!'l.yt.hing that can really be called 
ii discounting on 
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